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peaking of his art, Robert Barry used 
to say: “We are not really destroying 
the object, but just expanding the 
definition, that’s all”. In fact, Barry’s expres-
sion effectively sums up the work of most 
philosophers concerned with the issue of de-
fining the concepts of art and work of art. 
Between the lines of his sentence, and espe-
cially in the second half, Barry refers to what 
I call “the space between art and reality.” It 
is a particular idea: and yet it is exactly this 
space that both philosophers and artists refer 
to, when they work on the problems posed 
by the definition of art. To revise or expand 
the definition means precisely to reflect on 
the ways in which art belongs to reality. 
In this context, I will argue that the work 
done by artists in the last century has led to a 
systematic attempt at an artistic disenfran-
chisement of reality. In other words, artists 
have tried to dismiss reality through art, ex-
panding the domain of art to the point of 
making it ideally coincide with that of re-
ality. Finally, I will argue that this attempt 
(which, as we shall see, had disastrous out-
comes) was far deeper and more systematic 
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than the other, much more famous attempt: 
the philosophical disenfranchisement of art. 
The latter was the topic of the eponymous 
1986 essay by Arthur Danto, who is explic-
itly inspired by Hegel. As is well known, 
Hegel regards art as a step in the path of 
human reason, engaged in the process of 
formation of self-consciousness. In this pro-
gressive self-determination of conscious life, 
which corresponds to a gradual clarification 
of personal identity, reason goes through 
three stages: religion, art and philosophy. 
Art, religion and philosophy lead to the 
knowledge of the same truth from different 
points of view and with different degrees of 
perfection. Religion provides a representa-
tion of truth, while philosophy leads to a 
complete conceptual understanding of it.  
In the space between religion and phi-
losophy, Hegel puts art: unlike the first two, 
art expresses the awareness that the spirit has 
of itself and it does so neither through the 
representations of faith nor through the pure 
concepts of philosophy, but using objects 
that belong to the outside world and that 
have been created specifically to meet this 
purpose. To express ourselves in terms that 
are not properly Hegelian, but that certainly 
reflect Hegel’s influence, artworks embody 
reason in a material body, which is the me-
dium of the work. 
The perfect embodiment, the one in 
which reason unfolds without residues and 
in a total way, is the embodiment of reason 
in philosophy. Hence the well-known thesis 
by Hegel according to which art culminates 
in philosophy: that is, in fact, “the end of 
art.” The thesis brought forward by Hegel 
S 
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expresses a position that belongs together 
with the philosophy of art and the philoso-
phy of history. 
The version of the thesis of the end of art 
formulated by Danto, probably one of the 
best-known re-enactments of the Hegelian 
thesis, stands clearly in the footsteps of He-
gel; however, it intends to move from the 
sphere of philosophy of history to that of de-
scriptive metaphysics. Danto outlines con-
clusions similar to those reached by Hegel 
(philosophy disenfranchises art), but he does 
so by supporting his argument with an ob-
servation and a theoretical consideration. 
The observation is based on the historical 
and critical revision of the role played by 
Abstract Expressionism – that is, by the ar-
tistic movement that has carried out a radical 
paradigm shift within the modes of produc-
tion of traditional arts.  
Ever since Abstract Expressionism, and 
then in Pop Art, Fluxus, Conceptual Art and 
Minimalism, art (which has been excellently 
explained for centuries by the Vasari para-
digm) has been completed, or more pre-
cisely, resolved in philosophy. The Dantian 
argument also provides for a reconsideration 
of the contributions that aesthetics has made 
to the understanding of art. Since he con-
siders aesthetics as the science of sensory 
knowledge, Danto believes that it has little 
to say about artworks, objects that have a 
very important semantic component.  
Both Hegel and Danto thus believe that 
philosophy has the possibility to disenfran-
chise art, taking the place of its practices and 
solving the needs that lead to artistic produc-
tion in the most effective way. But while 
Hegel casts his insight into the horizon of 
the philosophy of history, Danto believes to 
be in the exact historical moment in which it 
is possible to transform Hegel’s prediction 
into the mere description of a state of affairs. 
I will not go into the details of the two ver-
sions of the disenfranchisement argument, 
which in my opinion show important differ-
ences; what I would rather draw the reader’s 
attention to is the “other disenfranchise-
ment,” that operated by art over reality. 
It is obviously redundant to point out that 
art and artworks are part of reality; how-
ever, in terms of epistemology, it is perhaps 
more interesting to dwell on one point: the 
open space inhabited by art is a particular 
space in which rules and semantics apply 
that ordinary reality cannot afford. More 
than the majority of human activities, artistic 
practice constantly plays with reality, ex-
panding and shrinking the space in which to 
enforce the rules of ordinary reality. A not-
too- hidden aspiration of contemporary art 
has been, so to speak, that to dismiss ordi-
nary reality, consuming its borders, for the 
benefit of artistic reality. The more the 
boundaries of art expanded the more, 
ideally, the boundaries of the ordinary 
would withdraw, thus realizing the old ro-
mantic dream of transforming reality into 
art. The significance of artistic practice is 
therefore in many ways enclosed within the 
confines that art itself sets and that separate 
it from ordinary reality. 
During the twentieth century, the disen-
franchisement project reached a program-
matic consistency: often artists have thus ex-
panded the boundaries of art to the point of 
ARTICLES 
PHILOSOPHICAL READINGS   ISSUE VI – NUMBER 2 – SUMMER 2014 
96!
making them coincide with reality. This has 
effectively led to the same risk noted by Luis 
Borges in A Universal History of Infamy, 
when reflecting on the titanic vocation that 
lies behind the desire of the total representa-
tion. If the Empire decides to create a perfect 
representation of the territory enclosed by 
its borders, making its cartographers draw a 
1:1 map, the realization of the map – as well 
shown by Umberto Eco1 – will come up 
against a double impossibility: the size of the 
map and its staticity. The map would be so 
extensive that – provided that it cannot be 
located in a different place from the Empire 
it represents – it would cover it. This fact 
should therefore be indicated on the map, in 
a virtually infinite process. In addition, the 
map would not be upgradeable: in the 1:1 
map every variation of the Empire should be 
instantly shown on the map. 
I think the example of Borges is useful to 
understand the problems posed by art in its 
relation with meta-conceptual issues. Pro-
vided that art is representation, rather than 
mimesis, what margin must the artists allow 
between art and ordinary reality for the lat-
ter not to dissolve in the former? In other 
words, what margin must they leave for art 
not to destitute reality, trying to impose it-
self as “the reality”? 
This second type of disenfranchisement 
includes many artists and a few philoso-
phers. Among the latter, the most significant 
is certainly Friedrich Nietzsche: in The Birth 
of Tragedy he explores the origins of the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Eco: 1992. 
choir, which is one of the distinctive ele-
ments of Attic tragedy. Nietzsche examines 
three hypotheses that literature, at that point 
in history, considered credible: according to 
the first, the choir had a so-called “political” 
function; for the second, however, it was a 
piece of reality put into the work. Finally, 
the third considered the choir as a boundary 
element, a kind of separator that stands be-
tween the work and the other-than-itself, i.e. 
the reality that the work is not. 
Discussing these assumptions, Nietzsche 
focuses in particular on the second, made by 
August Wilhelm von Schlegel, who pro-
poses a realist interpretation of the choir and 
considers it a piece of reality brought into 
the very heart of the tragedy. The choir 
would therefore be a kind of ideal spectator 
who has the function of representing the 
viewers who normally watch the tragedy. 
Nietzsche critiques this hypothesis by citing 
two arguments: the first is commonsensical, 
the second is substantial. The former sounds 
like this: not even the most daring of ideali-
zations would lead to exchange the audience 
with the choir, as there is too much differ-
ence between reality and idealization. The 
theoretical argument, as it is formulated and 
for issues it tackles, deserves a few more 
words. The Schlegelian thesis in the words 
of Nietzsche sounds like this: “For we had 
always thought that the proper spectator, 
whoever he might be, must always remain 
conscious that he has a work of art in front 
of him, not an empirical reality; whereas, the 
tragic chorus of the Greeks is required to 
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recognize the shapes on the stage as living, 
existing people.”2 
Nietzsche ‘s objection is clear: if the func-
tion of the chorus were to reproduce the 
mechanisms of “spectatorship” by bringing 
the audience into the tragedy, something in 
the construction of the artistic mechanism 
would not work. To use Nietzsche’s words: 
a spectator without a spectacle is an absurd 
notion. For the viewer to grasp the spec-
tacle, she must be aware of the fact that what 
she is watching is, in fact, a spectacle. She 
must know that it is something about some 
aspect of reality, but not ordinary reality 
pure and simple. 
Picasso remarked the same thing, in his 
own way, when he put a real label on a 
(drawn) bottle of Suze. An artist who creates 
a work with the express purpose of keeping 
the viewer unaware of the reality of the 
work ends up problematizing the basic rela-
tionship between the work and the spectator 
– which, as a rule, is the element that makes 
the enjoyment of art possible. Aristotle, in 
the Poetics, stressed the importance of cogni-
tively grasping the difference between re-
ality and fiction for the enjoyment of art to 
be determined in the manner appropriate to 
it. This point is very clear as for what con-
cerns the emotions we experience in the ar-
tistic relation: “ Objects which in themselves 
we view with pain, we delight to contem-
plate when reproduced with minute fidelity: 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 Nietzsche: 2008, p. 27. 
such as the forms of the most ignoble ani-
mals and of dead bodies”.3 
For this relationship to exists and to be ef-
fective, so as to allow the enjoyment of art, it 
is a necessary condition that the viewer has 
some awareness of the object that is part of 
the relation. Otherwise it would be like a 
child who, riding a broom and pretending 
that it is a horse, thought to be riding a horse 
for real. The game would give way to mis-
understanding. This means that, if the struc-
ture of the work does not incorporate or 
does not require the presence of a fictional 
marker, the artwork will be, all in all, a bad 
work. For this reason, Nietzsche shows to 
openly prefer the reading given by Friedrich 
Schiller in the Bride of Messina. Schiller 
understands the choir as a “living wall”, de-
veloping a theoretical hypothesis opposite to 
that of Schlegel. The choir is the fictional 
marker that allows one to mark with good 
evidence the distinction between the work, 
its semantic-epistemic dimension and ordi-
nary reality (which is characterized by partly 
different logics and meanings). 
In short, Nietzsche’s thesis is that the 
choir was introduced with the specific pur-
pose of marking (and not deleting!) the dis-
tinction between art and reality. This marker 
also made it necessary to rethink the mimetic 
function of art, another aspect on which 
Nietzsche returns several times in The Birth 
of Tragedy: “Tragedy grew up out of this 
foundation and, for that very reason, has, 
from its inception, been spared the embar-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
3 Poetics: 48b 9-12. 
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rassing business of counterfeiting reality. 
That is not to say, however, that it is a world 
arbitrarily fantasized somewhere between 
heaven and earth. It is much rather a world 
possessing the same reality and credibility as 
the world of Olympus, together with its in-
habitants, had for the devout Greek”.4  
Thus, Nietzsche considers the reproduc-
tion of reality as something fundamentally 
embarrassing. This idea presents strong 
echoes of the concept of mimesis that was 
offered by Plato: mimesis can always hide 
deception, we run the risk of mistaking the 
real thing for the mimetic copy produced by 
the artist, unless the artist is not particularly 
careful to ensure that deception does not oc-
cur by taking the necessary precautions, so 
as to distinguish reality from the artwork. 
In summary, therefore, we can put it this 
way: art has traditionally adopted, among its 
duties, that of representing reality. Nietzsche 
in The Birth of Tragedy puts us on track to 
specify the significance of artistic representa-
tion. One of the earliest forms of representa-
tion that we have knowledge of deals with 
the sacred: it is the idea that the tragic actor 
is the vehicle through which the divine is 
physically present, being incorporated in the 
actor. So the deity re-presents itself con-
cretely in space and in time. A refinement 
and evolution of the practice of tragic the-
atre has allowed the parallel refinement of 
the concept and practice of representation: 
the god is not embedded in a living body, 
but rather the body of the actor refers to the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 Nietzsche: 2008, p. 28.  
concept of divinity. And so representation, 
including the artistic one, creates a gap be-
tween reality and artistic fiction. 
Precisely this point, caught with fine 
sensitivity by Nietzsche, is the one tackled 
by much of contemporary art, ever since 
Abstract Expressionism. It has been a 
gradual process, achieved by means of the 
changes introduced in artistic practice: from 
a refined and even mannerist use of repre-
sentation, which reached its peak in Abstract 
Expressionism, a second stage was reached 
exemplified by post-historical arts (Pop art 
embodies the moment of transition from the 
first to the second phase). Through this pas-
sage, art has sought to disenfranchise reality, 
minimizing the space separating it from fic-
tion and ultimately aiming to replace reality 
with art. All in all, it seems that art has cre-
ated the perfect reversal of Plato’s thought: 
the true reality is the one presented by art, 
which – after having nullified the represen-
tational component – has come to use very 
real and everyday objects in place of the ar-
tefacts created specially by the artists. 
According to Plato, the craftsman – that 
is, by hypothesis, the manufacturer of beds – 
constructs beds that mimic the “idea of bed” 
and the artist, in turn, sketches something 
that looks like that idea. By contrast, My 
Bed, in the intentions of Tracy Emin, is a 
real bed that re-presents itself and the mean-
ings embedded in the material object. The 
artefact, Tracy’s bed, is taken and intro-
duced in the context of art, in this case the 
museum, which is also a robust fictional 
marker. The fact that we find Emin’s bed in 
a museum – the work was exhibited at the 
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Tate Gallery in 1999 – has the effect of 
warning us that this is not just any bed. 
In 1955 Robert Rauschenberg created the 
conditions for the bed-work of Emin to be 
possible: by hanging, literally, sheets, a 
blanket and a pillow on a canvas, he reas-
sembled them in the guise of a bed, and then 
dirtied them with colour with the typical 
gesture of dripping. Rauschenberg’s work is 
still somewhat linked to Abstract Expres-
sionism, while anticipating Pop Art. The fic-
tional marker in this case is embedded in the 
structure of the work: not only is the bed 
hung on a wall, but it is properly hung on a 
canvas, that is, a painting (so to speak). So it 
becomes a painting itself, and is fully 
brought back to the fictional space. How-
ever, Rauschenberg’s idea implies that in the 
space of fiction, which is clear, the represen-
tation takes place through the mechanism of 
re-presentation of something that looks very 
much like the thing itself. 
Ordinary reality signifies itself – this is 
the idea – more effectively through its re-
presentation than through its representa-
tions. This is what Emile De Antonio sug-
gested to Andy Warhol when he asked him 
what he thought of two versions of a draw-
ing of a Coca-Cola. The first was inspired 
by Abstract Expressionism, the second had 
instead a strong realistic character. De An-
tonio convincingly suggested that Warhol 
should draw the Coca-Cola realistically as it 
was the only way to genuinely grasp the re-
ality of the sixties. Reality pure and simple is 
best rendered if it is re-presented rather than 
represented, that is, if the artist tries to can-
cel the difference between reality and fiction. 
This is also the reason why Brillo Box, made 
perhaps a little more beautiful by Warhol, 
could be exhibited at the Stable Gallery in 
the famous 1964. However, while Andy 
Warhol and Pop Art in general were still 
sensitive to the aesthetic properties of the 
works, Tracy Emin utterly neglects them, 
leaving ordinary reality charged of as much 
reality as possible. 
Now, it is important to ask two questions, 
the first of which brings us back to the di-
lemma that Plato expressed in the tenth book 
of the Republic. In those pages Plato argues 
that if the artist’s goal is to obtain copies of 
ordinary reality, it would be more effective 
to use mirrors rather than brushes and 
words. Artists, for their part, seem to have 
followed him all too literally, since not only 
have they put aside their brushes, but they 
even started using real things, re-presenting 
reality as it is. Here are the questions: why 
regard the bed by Tracy Emin as art? And, 
besides, are we sure that this operation 
should be interpreted as a sign of a philo-
sophical disenfranchisement of art (the same 
to which Hegel and Danto referred to, albeit 
with different emphases, when thinking 
about the fate of art)? I believe that the goal 
of post-historical arts is the revival of an old 
romantic goal, also picked up by Nietzsche: 
provided that art is infinitely richer in sense, 
meaning and, ultimately, being compared to 
ordinary reality, it would be reasonable to 
hope that reality ends up being completely at 
one with art. 
The beds of Rauschenberg and Emin ex-
emplify and pursue an old dream of the ar-
tists: to reduce the fictional space for the 
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benefit of art. That is, to bring ordinary re-
ality completely back to art. This dream has 
its roots in the divine that Nietzsche saw as 
the origin of tragedy, or, to put it more secu-
larly, in the will to power that belongs to 
anyone who has a strong creative instinct. 
The artist seemingly bends to reality by 
agreeing to re-present rather than imitate or 
represent it. However, he knows that in this 
game – that would have as a final result the 
artistic disenfranchisement of ordinary re-
ality – he must always make sure to leave 
within the work, or within its space of exist-
ence, the fictional marker that avoids the on-
tological collapse between art and reality. 
Without the fictional marker – here lies the 
failure of the ontological project of post-
historical arts – art would disappear, while 
reality would continue to exist as such. 
Artists have used different strategies to 
hide the fictional marker: they’ve moved it, 
taking it away from the physical structure of 
the work and placing it on the outside, refer-
ring it back to the context. They have trans-
formed it from physical marker into agentive 
marker, linked, for example, to the actions of 
performance artists. They have tried to hide 
it, making it visible only under certain con-
ditions or at certain times of the life of the 
work. The point, though, is that no artist can 
delete it, because the fictional marker is a 
necessary condition for the work to exist. It 
is a necessary condition for the opening of 
the ontological space in which anything 
whatsoever may re-present or represent a 
different meaning, other than the usual one 
expressed by a given object. I think we can 
conclude that this project of disenfranchise-
ment has failed. If artists finally realized this, 
art would likely go back to doing what it 
does best: embodying meanings in objects 
capable of expressing them in exemplary 
ways. 
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